IDENTIFYING, PROTECTING AND
PRESERVING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS:
TRADITIONAL FEDERAL COURT
FUNCTIONS
Honorable RogerJ. Miner*
As an employer of recent law school graduates and a sometime teacher of law students, I have become a great admirer of
the teaching and scholarship of the law professoriate. I have only
a few criticisms that are applicable generally to the present-day
work of those who have devoted their legal careers to scholarship
and education. In an earlier article I noted that "new lawyers are
less equipped to handle the demands of modern law practice
than those of a previous generation" as a consequence of "[t]he
changing focus of academics, from doctrinal scholarship to interdisciplinary studies."' Indeed, law school curricula seem to be
developing without much concern for real-world relevance. For
example, I recently received a letter of recommendation from a
professor who urged me to hire a student of his as a law clerk on
the basis of the student's outstanding performance in a course
called "Bloodfeuds." Although my court handles a rich variety
of cases, we never have had one that would fit within that topical
heading. Perhaps the professor thought that the course would be
of interest to me in connection with my relations with my colleagues. In the same article, I placed at the door of academia the
responsibility for the failure of recent law graduates "to obtain
the oral and written skills of expression necessary for the survival
of the profession."' 2 Law review articles and other writings by
academics themselves often are so obscure as to be incomprehensible and therefore of little value to the bench and bar. When
academics talk only to each other, the rest of the profession
suffers.
I have noticed that recent law school graduates increasingly
tend to discuss court decisions in terms of the perceived predilections of judges rather than on the basis of legal principles and
* Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit; Adjunct Professor, New York Law School.
I Roger J. Miner, Confronting the Communication Crisis in the Legal Profession, 34
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1, 16 (1989).
2 Id.
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legal doctrine. This practice comes, as I understand it, from the
inclination of most law professors to classify judges, particularly
Supreme Court Justices, as "liberal," "conservative," "moderate," "activist," etc., and to examine their decisions on the basis
of such classifications. It seems to me that this approach is especially dangerous to legal analysis because: i) it leads law students
away from a proper understanding of legal principles; ii) it impedes the development of "think-like-a-lawyer" skills; and iii) it is
valueless for predictive purposes, being based on the flawed
premise that each judge has an ascertainable agenda. The professoriate would do well to abandon this approach.
"Public policy" is a response all too frequently given by
young lawyers when asked to articulate the principles upon which
a court decision is grounded. While public policy concerns
should not be neglected in legal analysis, those who "profess"
the law have an obligation to make their students aware that
judges are guided by much more than public policy and that precedent, legal reasoning, rules of statutory interpretation, logic
and stare decisis also merit study. Alison Reppy,3 who was Dean
of my alma mater, New York Law School, during my student days
frequently repeated the foll6wing: "Public policy is the wastebasket of legal thinking." I proudly repeated that aphorism to a recent graduate of a so-called "national" law school, and she
commented as follows: "Isn't that strange? We were taught that
legal reasoning is the wastebasket of public policy!" It seems to
me that the modern legal education stew could do with a pinch
less of "public policy" salt.
Teachers of law hardly can be described as faddists. Most
(especially those who are tenured) are free-spirited individualists,
always ready to abandon the beaten path, to shed new light on
old doctrine, to challenge conventional wisdom, to reinterpret
received knowledge, to revise history and to pour new wine into
old bottles (and drink it). They revel in their eccentricities, and
this is all to the benefit of their students, their colleagues and the
legal profession at large. And yet - despite their independence
law professors are all too receptive to fads. The current fad,
universally accepted and demonstrated in numerous scholarly
-

3 Still available from West Publishing Co. is a book co-authored by Dean Reppy
and Joseph Koffler, another one of my professors. The book is entitled KOFFLER
AND REPPY's HORNBOOK ON COMMON LAW PLEADING (1969). Who am I to complain
about "Bloodfeuds"? I had to study "Common Law Pleading."
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writings, is the use of the term "normative." '4 The use of that
term by academics has become so widespread as to be normative.
I no longer know or care what the word means. It has evolved
into so imprecise a word as to have no meaning at all for lawyers
and judges. I do not care if I never see it again.
This year I have received approximately 250 applications for
the three clerkship positions available in my chambers. Each is
accompanied by two or more letters of recommendation from
law professors. A typical letter includes the following:
Of the three hundred students in my contracts class, Ms. Smith
achieved the third highest grade. She participated in classroom discussions, and I spoke to her after class on at least two
occasions. From these contacts, I have formed the conclusion
that Ms. Smith would be the most outstanding law clerk ever
to serve in any court anywhere at any time. If you desire further information, do not hesitate to call me at the telephone
number listed below. I am available in my office at the law
school from 9:45 a.m. to 10:15 a.m. on the third Thursday of
each month.
If I never see another letter of this type, it would be too soon!
Finally, and to the point of this Article, it is generally bruited
about by the professoriate that the federal courts did not become
concerned with individual rights until the twentieth century. According to common academic wisdom: "[t]he concern of the framers, especially the Federalists who fully supported the venture, was
principally with creating a central government that would work and
last, not with whether that government of limited powers would engage in abuses of power." 5 From this viewpoint, individual rights
and the enforcement of those rights in the federal courts were not
on the minds of the Framers. In the same vein, one author has written as follows on the subject of "The Supreme Court and Individual
Rights:"
The Supreme Court's role as guardian of the rights and
liberties of the individual is a new one, a responsibility assumed in the twentieth century.
For most of its history, the Court had little to say about
the Constitution's guarantees of individual freedom. Preoccupied with defining the relationship of nation to state, state to
4 See, e.g., Martin A. Kotler, Competing Conceptions of Autonomy: A Reappraisalof the
Basis of Tort Law, 67 TUL. L. REV. 347, 383-84 (1992).
5 Stephen J. Wermiel, Rights in the Modern Era. Applying the Bill of Rights to the
States, 1 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 121, 122 (1992).
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state, and government to business, the Court found little occasion and less reason to deal with individual rights.
Indeed, until the twentieth century there was no broad
constitutional basis for the assertion of individual rights
against government action.6
My purpose is to demonstrate that the original Constitution was
concerned with individual rights, that the Bill of Rights gave even
greater voice to this concern and that, from the beginning, the federal courts were deeply involved in identifying, protecting and preserving individual constitutional rights.
In writing the original Constitution, the Framers were indeed
concerned with establishing a structure of government. They certainly were occupied with questions of separation of powers, of federalism and of commerce. But a close examination of the document
itself demonstrates that the rights of individual citizens were very
much on the minds of those who drafted the Charter. In the article
dealing with legislative powers, the Constitution provides: "The
Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may
require it." 7 Another clause in the same article mandates that "No
Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed." 8 The same
article imposes restrictions upon the States in respect of individual
rights: "No State shall .

.

. pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto

Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts .
Article III, the Judiciary Article, which extends the judicial
power "to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which
shall be made, under their Authority,"'" refers to individual rights
in the following particulars:
The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment,
shall be by jury; and such Trial shall be held in the State where
the said Crimes shall have been committed ....

I'

No Person shall be convicted of Treason unless on the
Testimony of two Witnesses to the same overt Act, or on Confession in open Court.' 2
...[N]o Attainder of Treason shall work Corruption of
6 ELDER WRIT, THE SUPREME COURT AND INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS 1
7 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, c. 2.

I, § 9, c. 3.
I, § 10, c. 1.
III, § 2, c. 1.
art. III, § 2, c. 3.
art. III, § 3, ci. 1.

8 U.S. CONST. art.
9 U.S. CONST. art.
10 U.S. CONST. art.

II U.S.
12

U.S.

CONST.
CONST.

(2d ed. 1988).
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Blood, or Forfeiture except during the Life of the Person
3
attainted. 1
Included in Article IV are two very significant provisions protective of individual rights. The first provision demands that "[t]he
Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several states."' 4 The second provision in Article IV mandates that "[t]he United States shall guarantee to every
State in this Union a Republican Form of Government .... .""
It seems clear that the Framers intended the federal judiciary to
enforce these rights. In discussing the importance of permanent
tenure for judges, Hamilton wrote:
This independence of the judges is equally requisite to
guard the Constitution and the rights of individuals from the effects of those ill humors which the arts of designing men, or
the influence of particular conjunctures, sometimes disseminate among the people themselves, and which, though they
speedily give place to better information, and more deliberate
reflection, have a tendency, in the mean time, to occasion dangerous innovations in the government, and16 serious oppressions of the minor party in the community.
That inflexible and uniform adherence to the rights of the
Constitution, and of individuals, which we perceive to be indispensable in the courts of justice, can certainly not be expected
from judges who hold their offices by a temporary
commission. 17
The provisions for individual rights and the constitutional guarantee of judicial independence clearly are interrelated. Judge Richard Posner, my colleague on the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals,
once stated the proposition most succinctly:
[I]t is hard to imagine why the framers of the Constitution
would have bothered to give the federal judges such extraordinary guarantees of independence if they had not expected
them to be aggressive in protecting individual rights against
encroachment by other branches of government - and plainly
they did; and though the framers' thinking ran more to property rights than to what we call civil liberties the constitutional
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 2.
14 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.
15 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
16 THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 469
13

1961) (emphasis added).
17 Id. at 470-71 (emphasis added).

(Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
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text is not so confined.'"
An excellent example of the role played by the federal courts in
the protection and enhancement of individual rights is found in the
enforcement of the constitutional provisions prohibiting Congress
or the state legislatures from passing bills of attainder.1 9 According
to the records of the Constitutional Convention, a unitary provision
prohibiting ex post facto laws as well as bills of attainder first was introduced and debated.20 Interestingly, some delegates thought that
a prohibition of ex post facto laws would be superfluous and were reluctant to support such a provision:
Mr. Govr. Morris thought the precaution as to ex post facto
laws unnecessary; but essential as to bills of attainder.
Mr. Elseworth [sic] contended that there was no lawyer,
no civilian who would not say that ex postfacto laws were void of
themselves. It cannot be necessary to prohibit them.
Mr. Wilson was against inserting anything in the Constitution as to ex postfacto laws. It will bring reflexions on the Constitution - and proclaim that we are ignorant of the first
principles of Legislation,
or are constituting a Government
2 1
which will be so.

The records of the Convention revealed that before any further debate was had on the ex post facto issue, "[t]he question [was] divided,
[and] [t]he first part of the motion relating to bills of attainder was
agreed to nem. contradicente."' 22 Although the ex post facto provision,
an important protection of individual rights, eventually was
adopted, it is apparent that the Framers perceived a greater danger
from legislative derelictions in regard to bills of attainder than from
legislative derelictions in regard to ex postfacto laws. An examination
of the history of bills of attainder makes it clear why this was so.
A sentence of death under the common law of England was said
to fix a mark of infamy upon the person to be executed, who was
"then called attaint, attinctus [or] stained."' 23 The consequences of
this common law attainder were the forfeiture to the crown of the
personal and real property of the attainted person and the "corruption of blood," which perforce forbade inheritance from ancestors
18 Richard A. Posner, The Meaning of Judicial Self-Restraint, 59 IND. L.J. 1, 15-16
(1983) (footnotes omitted).
19 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.

20

2

THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF

rand rev. ed. 1966.).
21 Id. at 376.
22

Id.

23 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES

*373.

1787, at 375-76 (Max Far-

19931
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and transmission of wealth and titles to heirs. 24 Bills of attainder,
being legislative enactments designed to inflict punishment without
trial, are different from the common law attainder that followed a
sentence of death following trial, and Blackstone recognized the sig25
nificant distinction between the two.
First enacted by the English Parliament around the year 1300,
bills of attainder originally were designed to ensure that dead traitors' estates would escheat to the crown. 26 They later were used to
punish those who engaged in a wide range of activities that were
considered inimical to the interests of the crown. 2 7 Bills of pains
and penalties, also enacted by the English Parliament, were different
from bills of attainder only in that they provided for punishments
other than death. 28 Unhappily, these English practices were imported to colonial America. 29 During the American Revolution,
each of the thirteen colonies enacted bills of attainder or bills of
pains and penalties directed at British loyalists.3 0 Bills of attainder
found their way into the laws of the new states, and the New York
Constitution, adopted on April 20, 1777, was typical in that it prohibited the state legislature from enacting bills of attainder but provided

an exception

"for

crimes

.

.

.

committed

before

the

war."- 31

Approximately sixty pieces of attermination of the present
tainder legislation were enacted in New York between the Declaration of Independence and the 1783 Treaty of Peace.3 2 Among these
was the Attainder Act of October 22, 1779, under which fifty-nine
New York citizens were subjected to the forfeiture of their property
24
25

Id. at *381.
As Blackstone noted:

As for acts of parliament to attaint particular persons of treason or
felony, or to inflict pains and penalties, beyond or contrary to the

common law, to serve a special purpose, I speak not of them; being to
all intents and purposes new laws, made pro re nata, and by no means

an execution of such as are already in being.
Id. at *256.
26 Michael P. Lehmann, The Bill of Attainder Doctrine:A Survey of the Decisional Law,
5 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 767, 772 (1978); Note, Bills of Attainder and the Supreme Court
in 1960 - Flemming v. Nestor, 1961 WASH. U. L.Q 402, 403.
27 Comment, The Bounds of Legislative Specification: A Suggested Approach to the Bill of
Attainder Clause, 72 YALE L.J. 330, 331 (1962).
28 Id.
29 Alison Reppy, The Spectre of Attainder in New York, 23 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 1, 3-4
(1948).
30 Raoul Berger, Bills of Attainder. A Study of Amendment by the Court, 63 CORNELL L.
REV. 355, 376-79 (1978).
31 Quoted in Reppy, supra note 29, at 19.
32 See id. at 17-35.
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as a consequence of being attainted.3 3 In Virginia, Thomas Jefferson himself, while serving in the legislature of that state in 1778,
participated in the adoption of legislation to attaint one Josiah Phil34
lips for "hav[ing] levied war against the Commonwealth.
It is clear that the Framers recognized the evils inherent in bills
of attainder. James Madison wrote that "[b]ills of attainder ... are
contrary to the first principles of the social compact and to every
principle of sound legislation."' 35 Quoting Montesquieu, he noted
the principal reason for prohibiting bills of attainder: "Again: 'Were
the power of judging joined with the legislative, the life and liberty
of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control, for the judge
would then be the legislator.' "36 There was some ambivalence in the
courts about enforcing the Bill of Attainder Clauses in the early
years of the Republic, however, because the bills enacted at the time
of the Revolution were designed to attaint the hated British loyalists
and to confiscate their property. For example, in Cooper v. Telfair, 7
the Court refused to declare that a 1782 act of the Georgia legislature attainting British loyalists was void. (It will be remembered
that the Constitution prohibited states as well as the federal government from enacting bills of attainder.) Each Justice who participated in the Cooper decision wrote a separate opinion, but the
opinion of Justice Samuel Chase expressed the common denominator: "There is . . . a material difference between laws passed by the

individual states, during the revolution, and laws passed subsequently to the organization of the federal constitution. Few of the
revolutionary acts would stand the rigorous tests now applied
"38 Clearly, the Court had a problem with bills of attainder
passed during the Revolutionary War.
The significant protections afforded by the Bill of Attainder
Clauses eventually found full expression in the cases involving the
so-called "test oath" statutes that were the product of the Civil War.
On the same day in 1867, the Supreme Court decided two cases
involving test oaths that clarified bill of attainder jurisprudence and,
in doing so, struck an important blow for individual rights. In Cummings v. Missouri,39 the Court examined a provision of the Missouri
33

Id. at 22.

34 Thomas Jefferson, Bill to AttaintJosiahPhillips (May 28, 1778), reprinted in 3 THE
FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 345, 345 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987).
35 THE FEDERALIST No. 44, at 282 (James Madison).
36 THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 303 (James Madison).

37 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 14 (1800).
38 Id. at 19.
39 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 227 (1867).
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State Constitution declaring it a criminal offense for a Catholic
priest to engage in his priestly duties without complying with the
Missouri constitutional requirement that he swear under oath that
he did not support the Confederacy. Finding the state constitution
in conflict with the Federal Constitution's Bill of Attainder Clause,
which had been read broadly to prohibit bills of pains and penalties
as well as bills of attainder, the Supreme Court noted that the intention of the clause was "that the rights of the citizen should be secure
against deprivation for past conduct by legislative enactment, under
any form, however disguised."4 Similarly, in Ex parte Garland,4 the
Court found that an act of Congress prohibiting any person who
would not swear that he had not supported the Confederacy from
holding public office or practicing law contravened the Bill of Attainder Clause. In both cases, the Court performed a traditional
federal court function by giving life and meaning to a constitutional
right.
Continuing to identify the Bill of Attainder Clause as an important individual right worthy of protection and preservation, the
Supreme Court in 1946 invalidated a statute that foreclosed the payment of salaries to three federal employees said to be "subversive. '42 The Court there noted that individuals need not be
targeted by name because the Constitution forbids any legislation,
"no matter what [its] form, that appl[ies] either to named individuals or to easily ascertainable members of a group in such a way as to
inflict punishment on them without a judicial trial." 4 3 In 1965 the
Court overturned legislation that barred certain Communist Party
members from labor union employment. 4 4 The Court once again
warned against a cramped definition of punishment for bill of attainder purposes and reiterated its "emphatic[] reject[ion] [of] the argument that the constitutional prohibition outlawed only a certain
class of legislatively imposed penalties. 4 5
Ultimately, the Court defined punishment for bill of attainder
purposes in terms of three tests to be applied to challenged legislation, an affirmative answer to any one of the tests being sufficient to
meet the definition: "(1) whether the challenged [act] falls within
the historical meaning of legislative punishment; (2) whether the
[act] 'viewed in terms of the type and severity of burdens imposed,
40
41
42

43
44
45

Id. at 325.
71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1867).
See United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946).
Id. at 315.
See United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965).
Id. at 447-48.
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reasonably can be said to further nonpunitive legislative purposes';
and (3) whether the legislative record 'evinces a congressional intent to punish.' "46 And so the courts, in the great common law
tradition, gave shape and substance to the stark verbiage of the original constitutional provision prohibiting the passing of bills of attainder by: i) expanding the Bill of Attainder Clauses to include the
prohibition of pains and penalties; ii) extending protections to
members of named groups as well as named individuals; and iii) explicating the meaning of punishment for bill of attainder purposes.
Beginning in the aftermath of the American Revolution and continuing throughout American history up to the present, bill of attainder jurisprudence has evolved as the federal courts have performed
their traditional functions in relation to individual rights.4 7 Each
court decision in this area, including those discussed above, stands
as a separate argument to contradict the widely-held opinion that
"[t]he seeming [sic] individual liberties contained in the body of the
Constitution... were inserted into the federal Constitution because
they were necessary for a federal structure, not as an assurance of
rights considered fundamental or crucial to human happiness or
fulfillment." 4 8
The story of the adoption of the Bill of Rights need not be repeated at length here. Suffice it to say that Madison, although originally opposed to a so-called declaration of rights, eventually came
around to favor it and, in fact, became its author.4 9 The Federalists,
supporters of the Constitution in its original form, thought that a
national bill of rights was unnecessary because i) the Constitution
created a limited government and was not a threat to individual
rights; ii) an attempt to specify rights could be harmful because certain important rights that were not listed might be considered unprotected; iii) a national bill of rights might reflect the "lowest
common denominator" of the rights considered important by the
individual states; and iv) a bill of rights might imply certain powers
in the federal government that were not intended."0 Added to this,
46 Selective Serv. Sys. v. Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Group, 468 U.S. 841,
852 (1984) (quoting Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 473, 47576, 478 (1977)).
47 See, e.g., In re Extradition of McMullen, Nos. 91-2402, 2420 (2d Cir. Mar. 24,
1993) (in banc) (majority and dissenting opinions).
48 WILLIAM E. NELSON & ROBERT C. PALMER, LIBERTY AND COMMUNITY: CONSTITUTION AND RIGHTS IN THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC 88 (1987).
49 David M. O'Brien, The Framers' Muse on Republicanism, the Supreme Court, and
Pragmatic ConstitutionalInterpretivism, 8 CONST. COMMENTARY 119, 131-37 (1991).
50 Maeva Marcus, The Adoption of the Bill of Rights, 1 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J.
115, 117 (1992).
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of course, would be the argument that the rights considered most
fundamental already were included in the original Constitution.
The Anti-Federalists, on the other hand, saw the omission of a bill
of rights as a basis for defeating the Constitution and urged the citizenry to demand additional constitutional provisions for individual
rights. 5 The ratification conventions of the states urged adoption
of certain individual rights amendments, and the First Congress
submitted twelve amendments to the states for ratification in 1789.
Ten of the amendments were ratified by the states by 1791 and became the Bill of Rights.5 2 What does need repeating here, in support of the theme of this Article, is the following statement made on
June 8, 1789 by James Madison during the debate in the House of
Representatives on the Bill of Rights amendments:
If they are incorporated into the constitution, independent
tribunals ofjustice will consider themselves in a peculiar manner the guardians of those rights; they will be an impenetrable
bulwark against every assumption of power in the legislative or
executive; they will be naturally led to resist every encroachment upon rights expressly stipulated for in the constitution
by the declaration of rights.5"
This statement may have had its genesis in a letter dated March 15,
1789 sent by Thomas Jefferson to Madison from Paris expressing
support for the proposed declaration of rights:
In the arguments in favor of a declaration of rights, you omit
one which has great weight with me, the legal check which it
puts into the hands of the judiciary. This is a body, which if
rendered independent, and kept strictly to their own department merits
great confidence for their learning and
54
integrity.
Both Jefferson and Madison correctly foresaw that the individual
rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights would find their primary
source of protection in the federal courts.
Besides adopting the constitutional amendments known as the
Bill of Rights, the First Congress adopted an enduring piece of legislation officially titled: "An Act to Establish the Judicial Courts of
the United States." 5 5 This legislation frequently has been referred
51
52
53

Id. at 116.
Id. at 118.
Quoted in2

BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY

1031 (1971).
54 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Mar. 15, 1789), in14
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 659, 659 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1958).
55 Ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73 (1789).
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to as the Judiciary Act of 1789 or the First Judiciary Act, and it established a three-level system of national courts that has continued,
with various changes related to the jurisdiction and functions of the
courts, to the present day.5 6 There can be little doubt of the interrelationship between the Bill of Rights and the First Judiciary Act.
Both were adopted with an eye to Anti-Federalist objections to the
lack of specificity in the Judiciary Article of the Constitution as well
5 7
as to the omission of a declaration of rights in the original Charter.
Accordingly, a number of rights in the Bill of Rights had to do with
the judiciary: i) the requirement of a grand jury indictment;5 8 ii) the
prohibitions against double jeopardy and self-incrimination; 59 iii)
the requirement of due process;60 incriminal cases, the rights to a
speedy and public trial by jury in the vicinage of the crime, 6 ' compulsory process to obtain favorable witnesses,6 2 and assistance of
counsel;6 3 iv) the right to trial by jury in suits at common law and a
restriction on the reexamination of facts so tried;' and v) the
prohibitions against excessive bail and cruel and inhuman punishment. 6 5 The complementary jurisdiction conferred upon each of
the three tiers of the new federal judicial system in civil and criminal
cases by the Judiciary Act of 1789 clearly evinced the intent of the
First Congress to establish "independent tribunals of justice" as
"guardians of [the bill of] rights." 6 6
It was not until 1833, in a case titled Barron v. The Mayor and City
Counsel of Baltimore6 7 that the Supreme Court decided that the Bill of
Rights applied only to the national government and did not restrict
state authority. The holding arose in the context of a claim by the
plaintiff that the City of Baltimore had rendered his wharf useless by
causing the deposit of large amounts of sand and earth to be made
56

See generally PAUL M.

BATOR ET AL., HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS

30-49 (3d ed. 1988) (tracing the evolution of the federal
court system).
57 Maeva Marcus & Natalie Wexler, The Judiciary Act of 1789: Political Compromise
or ConstitutionalInterpretation?,in ORIGINS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 13, 29 (Maeva
Marcus ed., 1992); see also WILFRED J. RITZ, REWRITING THE HISTORY OF THE JUDICIARY ACT OF 1789, at 21 (1990).
58 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
59 Id.
AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM

60 Id.
61

U.S.

62
63

Id.
Id.

CONST.

amend. VI.

64 U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
65 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
66 See supra note 53 and accompanying
67

32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).

text.
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near the wharf. The water adjacent to the wharf thereby became too
shallow for the berthing of most vessels and Barron sought recovery
on a claim of deprivation of property without due process, in violation of the Fifth Amendment. ChiefJustice Marshall saw the issue as
one "of great importance, but not of much difficulty," 6 8 and sent the
matter off by reasoning that the amendments were not explicitly made
applicable to the states:
[If] the framers of these amendments intended them to be limitations on the powers of the State governments they would
have imitated the framers of the original Constitution, and
have expressed that intention. Had Congress engaged in the
extraordinary occupation of improving the constitutions of the
several States by affording the people additional protection
from the exercise of power by their own governments in matters which concerned themselves alone, they would have
de69
clared this purpose in plain and intelligible language.
There are those who question whether the issue was as lacking
in difficulty as the Court perceived it to be. Professor Gerald Gunther, for example,
[n]ote[s] that a different inference might be drawn from the
text of the Bill of Rights: the First Amendment explicitly inhibits "Congress" (but has been read to apply to the entire national government); the Seventh Amendment is explicitly
addressed to "any Court of the United States"; but all of the
other Bill of Rights provisions speak in general terms. And a
few courts, before Barron, thought those provisions generally
applicable.7 °
As will be seen, it was not until the courts seized upon the Fourteenth Amendment that the Bill of Rights would be considered to
protect against state action. Until then, however, the courts would
continue to identify, protect and preserve individual rights against
adverse action by the federal government as specifically provided in
the original Constitution as well as in the Bill of Rights.
It often escapes notice that the celebrated case establishing the
power of the federal courts to review legislative acts was all about
the enforcement of individual rights. In Marbury v. Madison,7 * William Marbury and three others sought mandamus to compel the delivery of commissions evidencing appointment as justices of the
68
69

Id. at 247.
Id. at 250.
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peace for the District of Columbia. Although the Court concluded
that Congress was without constitutional authority to confer original
mandamus jurisdiction upon the Supreme Court, a history-making
decision establishing the power ofjudicial review, the Court made it
clear that Marbury and the others were entitled to the delivery of the
commissions, which had been signed by the President and sealed by
the Secretary of State. Although the Supreme Court was the wrong
place to go for the relief sought, Chief Justice Marshall acknowledged the role of the courts in the enforcement and protection of
the rights of the citizenry:
The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the
right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws,

whenever he receives an injury. One of the first duties of government is to afford that protection. In Great Britain the King
himself is sued in the respectful form of a petition, and he
never fails to comply with the judgment of his court.7 2
.... The province of the court is, solely, to decide on the
rights of individuals, not to inquire how the executive, or execu73
tive officers, perform duties in which they have a discretion.
It is generally accepted that the Framers intended the federal
courts to have the power of judicial review, despite the lack of a
specific provision in the Constitution. According to Hamilton, limitations on legislative authority
can be preserved in practice no other way than through the
medium of courts of justice, whose duty it must be to declare
all acts contrary to the manifest tenor of the Constitution
void.7 4
The interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of the courts. A constitution is, in fact, and must be regarded by the judges as, a fundamental law. It therefore
belongs to them to ascertain its meaning as well as the meaning of any particular act proceeding from the legislative
body.7 5
Federal court power to review state laws also has served as an important protection for individual rights. In Fletcher v. Peck,7 6 one of
the earliest cases to assert the power, the Supreme Court invali72

Id. at 163 (emphasis added).

73 Id. at 170 (emphasis added).

74 THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 466 (Alexander Hamilton).
75 Id. at 467. For further historical support for the intentions

of the framers in
regard to judicial review, see George S. Brown, The Supreme Court's Duty to Defend the
Constitution, 14 WASH. L. REV. 202 (1939).
76 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).

19931

PRESERVING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS

835

dated a Georgia statute that purported to annul certain conveyances
of land supposed to have been made corruptly by the state to private
persons. The Court there enforced the rights of a good faith purchaser, determining that the state law impaired the obligation of
contracts within the meaning of Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution. Fletcher came to the Supreme Court on a writ of error to the
Circuit Court for the District of Massachusetts. 7
A later case invalidating a state statute, Martin v. Hunter's
Lessee,78 came to the Supreme Court on a writ of error to the Court
of Appeals of the State of Virginia. Martin was a British citizen who
asserted a claim to land in Virginia under a line of title going back to
the days before the Revolutionary War. Hunter claimed title as the
beneficiary of state laws confiscating the lands of British subjects
and parceling them out to the citizens of Virginia. Martin claimed
protection under a federal treaty, but the Virginia Courts rejected
his argument. In an earlier appeal, the Supreme Court had reversed
a Virginia Court of Appeals' ruling against Martin and remanded for
the entry of judgment in his favor . 7v The Supreme Court determined on appeal that Martin's title was secured by the treaty and
that the state law was subordinate to federal treaties under the
Supremacy Clause." ° On remand, the Virginia Court refused to recognize the determination of the Supreme Court, finding not only
that the case should have been decided differently under state law
but that the Supreme Court could not exercise appellate jurisdiction
over cases decided in state courts. The Supreme Court, of course,
rejected both contentions.
In deciding Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, the Supreme Court referred specifically to section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789. Section
25 provided for Supreme Court review of decisions of the highest
court in a state: (i) where a state court declares invalid a treaty or
statute or an act under the authority of the United States; (ii) where
a state court declares valid a state statute or an act authorized by the
state over a claim of invalidity grounded in the Constitution or laws
77

Id. at 87.

14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
See Fairfax's Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee, II U.S. (7 Cranch) 603, 628 (1813).
80 The Supremacy Clause provides that:
This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be
made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby,
any thing in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary
notwithstanding.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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of the United States; and (iii) where a state court decides against a
right, title, exemption or privilege claimed by a party under any
clause of the Constitution or under a federal treaty or statute, or
under a commission held under the authority of the United States.
According to the Supreme Court in Martin:
[T]he 25th section of the judiciary act, which authorizes the
exercise of this jurisdiction in the specified cases, by a writ of
error, is supported by the letter and spirit of the constitution
It is an historical fact that at the time when the judiciary
act was submitted to the deliberations of the first Congress,
composed, as it was, not only of men of great learning and
ability, but of men who had acted a principal part in framing,
supporting, or opposing that constitution, the same exposition
was explicitly declared and admitted by the friends and by the
opponents of that system. It is an historical fact . . .that no

state tribunal has ever breathed a judicial doubt on the subject, or declined to obey the mandate of the Supreme Court,
until the present occasion.8"
Section 25 also provided some support for the power to review
the constitutionality of federal laws. Certainly, where a state court
declared a federal statute or treaty invalid on federal constitutional
grounds, and the Supreme Court exercised its appellate jurisdiction
under section 25, the Supreme Court would perforce review the
constitutionality of the federal statute. Although the power ofjudicial review is firmly established, and although it has played, and continues to play, an essential role in the protection of individual rights,
there are those who regard it as a judicial usurpation, unauthorized
by the Constitution or its historical antecedents. The following
statement, included in a unanimous Supreme Court decision issued
in 1958, has been the target of much criticism: "[Marbury v. Madison]
declared the basic principle that the federal judiciary is supreme in
the exposition of the law of the Constitution, and that principle has
ever since been respected by this Court and the Country as a perma82
nent and indispensable feature of our constitutional system."
Those who object to this characterization speak to the duty of the
executive and legislative branches to exercise their own judgments
as to constitutionality.8 " The debate goes on. 84 It is, however, a
most futile debate, because the concept of judicial review long has
See Martin, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) at 351-52.
Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958).
See, e.g., WILLIAM B. LOCKHART ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 13-15 (6th ed.
1986).
81
82
83
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been accepted in its present form by the nation's citizens, who consider it essential to the protection of the rights they cherish.8 5
The Civil War was fought over individual rights and, in its aftermath, the federal courts of necessity became more extensively involved in protecting the individual rights of the citizenry. Even
during the war, individual rights clashed with presidential power,
when President Lincoln suspended the writ of habeas corpus and
established martial law in an area not involved in active military operations.8 6 Individual rights prevailed when the Supreme Court ultimately held that martial law "can never be applied ... where the

courts are open and their process unobstructed.- 8 7 It was the Fourteenth Amendment, however, that enlarged the individual rights
that the federal courts could enforce against the states. The second
of the three new constitutional amendments proposed by the
Reconstruction Congress, the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified
in 1868. Its language invited the courts to identify the rights of
United States citizens and to protect those rights against state
encroachments:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any 8person
within its
8
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
The federal courts were quick to accept the invitation, and the rule
of Barron v. Baltimore89 eventually would fall by the wayside as the
Supreme Court determined that most of the rights in the Bill of
Rights were incorporated in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Adding to the expansion of the role of the federal courts in the enforcement of individual rights was the vesting of
general federal question jurisdiction upon the lower courts in
1875.90
84

See generally WHO

SPEAKS FOR THE CONSTITUTION? THE DEBATE OVER INTER-

(John W. Brewer ed., 1992).
Depression-era examination of the application of the power of
judicial review in regard to civil liberties, see generally Osmond K. Fraenkel,Judicial
PRETIVE AUTHORITY
85 For a critical,

Review and Civil Liberties, 6 BROOK. L. REV. 409 (1937). I think that the historical
overview included in the article supports my contention that the Supreme Court
has made extensive use of judicial review in the protection of individual rights.
86 Article One, Section nine, Clause two of the Constitution provides: "The
Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in
Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it."
87 Exparte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 121 (1866).
88 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
89 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
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At first, the Supreme Court enforced various rights enumerated
in the Bill of Rights on the authority of the Fourteenth Amendment
itself and without referring to the Bill of Rights."' In an 1897 case,
for example, the Court dealt with the requirement for just compensation in eminent domain takings on the basis of the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause rather than the Fifth Amendment
provision. 2 It was not until 1925 that the Supreme Court first imported a right from the Bill of Rights into the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment for application to the states. The imported right was the free speech guaranty of the First Amendment.9" Other rights similarly were imported, and the federal
courts vigorously pursued their duty to enforce them. By 1934,
some perceived that the federal courts had changed functions to the
extent that their primary function had become the enforcement of
the Bill of Rights. As one commentator noted:
[T]he Bill of Rights seems about to become the most important part of the Constitution. To it alone may the individual
appeal against the action of executives, boards and commissions, which sometimes by a single stroke of the pen attempt
to abolish the rights once deemed sacrosanct. It is his sole
refuge against the tyranny of the majority which that acute and
sympathetic critic of our institutions, Lord Bryce, once said
would become our greatest danger - a tyranny which Edmund Burke declared is greater than the tyranny of a monarch
because it is a multiplied tyranny. But of this Bill of Rights the
Federal Courts are the natural guardians. 4
This author went on to indicate that the "lower Federal Courts"
could perform their functions in regard to the Bill of Rights "only if
their power is constantly expanded and their prestige maintained
undimmed." 95
The question of what provisions of the Bill of Rights were intended to be incorporated in the Fourteenth Amendment has been
answered by the Supreme Court with tests grounded in generalities,
including: i) whether the provision in question is so fundamental as
to be "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty;" 9 6 ii) whether to
ignore the right is to violate a "principle of justice so rooted in the
traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as funda91 JOHN E. NOWAK, ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 411 (2d ed. 1983).

Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
Walter P. Armstrong, The Changing Function of the Federal Courts, 20 A.B.A. J.
441, 443 (1934).
92
93
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Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).

1993]

PRESERVING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS

839

mental;" 9 7 and iii) whether the provision is "fundamental to the
American scheme of justice.""8 In any event, the Supreme Court
has applied to the states over the years most of the provisions of the
first eight amendments. The unincorporated provisions include: the
Second Amendment right to bear arms; the Third Amendment prohibition on the quartering of troops in private homes; the Fifth
Amendment requirement of indictment by grand jury; the Seventh
Amendment right to a jury trial in civil cases; and the Eighth
Amendment protections against excessive fines and bail.9 9 The debate continues over the question of the incorporation of the Bill of
Rights and whether the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment really intended the Bill of Rights to be enforced against the states. 0 0
That debate also is a futile one, as even Robert Bork concedes: "The
controversy over the legitimacy of incorporation continues to this
day, although as a matter ofjudicial practice the issue is settled."''
The Tenth Amendment, of course, could never be applied as a
restriction on the states, inasmuch as it provides that "[t]he powers
not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to
the people." 0 2 The Ninth Amendment is quite another thing, however, even though it never has been applied to restrict the states
from infringing any individual rights. The Amendment declares that
"[t]he enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not
be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the
3
people." 10

It will be remembered that one of the arguments against a national Bill of Rights was based on the notion that rights not specified
might be considered unprotected against the depredations of the
federal government. It seems certain that the Ninth Amendment
was proposed to meet that argument. In Griswold v. Connecticut,' °4
Justice Goldberg concluded that the Ninth Amendment authorized
the courts to identify rights not specified in the Constitution, by relying on "the traditions and conscience""5' ' of the citizenry. Accord97
98

Id.
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).

99 Wermiel, supra note 5, at 129.

100 See, e.g., Earl Maltz, Book Review, 5 LAw & HIST. REV. 296 (1987); Michael
Zuckert, The Fourteenth Amendment and the Bill of Rights, 8 CONST. COMMENTARY 149

(1991) (book review).
101 ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 94 (1990).
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104 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
105 Id. at 487 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
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ingly, the Justice found in the Ninth Amendment a right of privacy.
His formulation was a vague one, and the Ninth Amendment has
faded into obscurity as far the federal courts are concerned. There
are those who argue that the Ninth Amendment meant little or
nothing in the first place,' 0 6 and there are others who argue that the
Ninth Amendment merely serves to direct the federal courts "to
adopt a broad view and liberal construction of the first eight amendments and to regard the personal liberties enumerated there as deserving the most meticulous,
fastidious, and expansive
protection."' 1 7 There are few who give the Ninth Amendment the
sweeping construction given by Justice Goldberg. I predict that a
future Supreme Court will reassess the Ninth Amendment in connection with the identification of unenumerated rights.
The identification and enforcement by the federal courts of individual rights not listed in the Constitution have given rise to bitter
debates over the years.' 0 8 What is certain is that courts have identified and enforced certain fundamental rights not explicitly provided
for in the Constitution: freedom of association; voting and participation in the electoral process; interstate travel; fairness in the criminal process; privacy; and "fairness in procedures concerning
individual claims against governmental deprivations of life, liberty,
or property."' 0 9 The references to life, liberty and property in the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments surely provide some basis for the
identification of the foregoing fundamental, albeit unlisted, rights.
The problem has been to define what is meant by "fundamental," a
vague and ambiguous term at best in this context. As one commentator has observed, "[o]ver the past half-century, jurists and scholars
have sought to derive these fundamental values from a variety of
sources, including natural law, tradition, the judge's own values,
neutral principles, reason, and society's 'widely shared' values."' 1 0
The sources all are properly the subject of criticism, and many of
the arguments against allowing the courts to identify nonexplicit
rights ring true. The concern over judicial overreaching is not without foundation. And yet, this debate also has reached the futile
stage, at least as to the nonexplicit rights already ratified as funda106 See, e.g., Lawrence G. Sager, You Can Raise the First, Hide Behind the Fourth, and
Plead the Fifth, But What on Earth Can You Do With the Ninth Amendment?, 64 CHI.-KENT

L.

REV. 239 (1988).
107 See Morris S.

Arnold, Doing More Than Remembering the Ninth Amendment, 64

CHI.-KENT L. REV. 265, 268 (1988)
108 NOWAK ET AL., supra note 91,

(emphasis added).

at 459.

109 Id. at 460.
110 Stephen E. Gottlieb, Compelling Governmental Interests: An Essential But
Unanalyzed Term in ConstitutionalAdjudication, 68 B.U. L. REV. 917, 925 (1988).
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mental. Simply put, the citizenry never will allow those rights to be
taken away.
An example of the identification of a unenumerated right is the
application of the Due Process Clause to establish the defense of
outrageous governmental conduct in the investigation of crime. An
outgrowth of the defense of entrapment, this defense originally was
suggested by the Supreme Court by way of dictum in United States v.
Russell."' In that case, the Court observed that there might one day
arise a situation "in which the conduct of law enforcement agents is
so outrageous that due process principles would absolutely bar the
government from invoking judicial processes to obtain a conviction
.... 12 In a later case, Hampton v. United States,'" 3 in which both the
entrapment and due process defenses were rejected, the Supreme
Court specifically recognized the availability of a defense based on
outrageous governmental conduct. Although the Supreme Court
never has sustained the defense, the lower courts have developed
and applied the concept of governmental overreaching and governmental misconduct as a due process defense in criminal prosecutions and, in some cases, have sustained the defense." 4 The lower
federal courts continue to work through the cases in an attempt to
arrive at a proper definition of the defense." 5 The Second Circuit
Court of Appeals recently remanded to the district court for further
exploration of the issue a case involving the use of a sexual relationship by an agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration to further
his investigation of a woman who ultimately was charged with conspiracy to traffic in narcotics. 1 6 The work of the courts in identifying and enforcing the rights of the people against outrageous
111 411 U.S. 423 (1973).
112 Id. at 431-32.
113 425 U.S. 484 (1976).
'14 See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 802 F.2d 1119 (9th Cir. 1986) (no due process
violation); United States v. Bogart, 783 F.2d 1428 (9th Cir.) (defendant has standing to challenge outrageousness of Government's conduct on due process
grounds), vacated sub nom., United States v. Wingender, 790 F.2d 802 (9th Cir.
1986); United States v. Thoma, 726 F.2d 1191 (7th Cir.) (no due process violation),
cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1228 (1984); United States v. Twigg, 588 F.2d 373 (3d Cir.
1978) (outrageous Government conduct violates due process); United States v.
West, 511 F.2d 1083 (3d Cir. 1975) (same); United States v. Archer, 486 F.2d 670
(2d Cir. 1973) (same); Greene v. United States, 454 F.2d 783 (9th Cir. 1971)

(same).
115 See Gail M. Greaney, Note, Crossingthe ConstitutionalLine: Due Process and the Law

Enforcement Justification, 67
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L. REV. 745, 747 (1992) ("propos[ing] a

methodology for utilizing the law enforcement justification to define the contours
of the due process defense").
116 See United States v. Cuervelo, 949 F.2d 559 (2d Cir. 1991).
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governmental conduct is merely a continuation of the work begun
over two centuries ago.
Joseph Story wrote: "In every well organized government,
therefore, with reference to the security both of public rights and
private rights, it is indispensable, that there should be a judicial department to ascertain, and decide rights ... ."17 Since the very

beginning of the Republic, the federal courts have been engaged in
the enterprise of ascertaining and deciding rights. Beginning with
the few rights enumerated in the original Constitution, including individual property rights, and continuing with the Bill of Rights and
the various unenumerated rights that have been identified, the federal courts have performed their assigned tasks of protecting and
preserving individual rights. These tasks were not suddenly undertaken in the twentieth century but have grown and evolved over the
years. Reflecting the desires of the American people themselves,
the courts have found ways and means to expand the individual
rights that all Americans take as their birthright. As Professor Abraham so cogently has put it: "[N]o other agency or institution of the
United States government has proved itself either so capable of performing, or so willing to undertake, the necessary role of guardian
11 8
of our basic rights as the judicial branch."
There are a number of reasons why the federal courts have
been so capable of performing their duties as guardians of the rights
of the people.' 1 9 An important reason, according to Nadine Strossen, is that their "insulation from the political sphere ensures that
federal courts should be able to enforce the rights of even unpopular individuals and minority groups."' 120 Whatever the reason, the
work is being done, as it has been done for two hundred years, and
the federal courts are performing their assigned function of "protect[ing] individual civil liberties against encroachment by either
federal or state government."' 12 ' I think that I have demonstrated
that it is incorrect to say that the "entry of the Supreme Court in
modern times into the review of infringements of civil liberties ...
began about 1925."' 122 I think that I also have demonstrated that
117 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

§ 818, at 582 (Carolina Academic Press photo. reprint 1987) (abr. ed. 1833).
24 (4th ed. 1982).
119 See Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article Il"Separatingthe Two Tiers
of FederalJurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. REV. 205, 235 (1985).
120 Nadine Strossen, The Supreme Court's Role: Guarantor of Individual and Minority
Group Rights, 26 U. RICH. L. REV. 467, 467 (1992).
121 Tom C. Clark, The Court and Its Functions, 34 ALB. L. REV. 497, 501 (1970).
122 John P. Frank, The Historic Role of the Supreme Court, 48 Ky. L.J. 26, 32 (1959).
118 HENRYJ. ABRAHAM, FREEDOM AND THE COURT
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the identification, protection and preservation of individual rights
has been the result of an evolutionary process - for the federal
23
courts and for the nation's citizens as well.'
Finally, I take note of a question that I often put to my law students on the first day of class: "Who has the final say about the
United States Constitution?" Too many answer: "The federal
courts.'"
123 See generally JOHN BRAEMAN, BEFORE THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION: THE OLD
COURT AND INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS

(1988).

